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Abstract 
 
This paper provides evidence of a change in the relationship between individual satisfaction with 
the state of country’s economy and income inequality during transition from a command to 
market economic system. Using data from a series of extensive and frequent surveys of Polish 
population, we identify a structural break in this relationship. In the beginning of transition, an 
increase in income inequality is interpreted by population as a positive signal of increased 
opportunities; this sentiment is particularly strong among older people and people with right-
wing political views. Later in the transition period, increased inequality becomes an important 
reason for dissatisfaction of the public with the country’s economic situation and reforms, as 
people become more skeptical about the legitimacy of income generation process. We also 
provide direct evidence from opinion polls of a change in the public sentiment about income 
inequality. 
 
JEL: C25, D31, D63, I30, P20, P26. 
Key words: inequality, subjective well-being, growth, breakpoint, transition. 
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1. Introduction 
Reform fatigue and disenchantment seem to have appeared in transition countries of Central and 
Eastern European, which abandoned command economy and embarked on a new development 
path based on market liberalization. The rise of populist parties relying on popular discontent 
with reforms was observed in a number of countries at the end of the last century despite the 
significant achievements in establishing democratic and market institutions, continuous economic 
growth, and NATO and the European Union accession (Desai and Olofsgärd, 2006; Denisova et 
al. 2008; Krastev, 2007). This contrasts with the remarkable popular support for reform and high 
expectations in the initial period.  In Poland, for instance, the initial strong consensus for reforms 
faded away in the middle of the 1990s, giving way to disappointment. The criticism of some of 
transition outcomes, such as corruption, growing inequality and a high price paid by the losers of 
transition, progressively became the dominant theme of public discourse. Popular discontent was 
associated with increasing distrust of political elites, viewed as corrupt and self-interested. We 
argue that in Poland, as in many other transition countries, the backlash of reforms is partly due 
to the rise in income inequality and the perception that the process of income distribution is 
flawed and corrupt (Brainerd, 1998; Milanovic, 1998, 1999; Kornai, 2006). 
As one of the central features of former socialist regimes – income equality – was replaced by 
sharp income differentiation, it is no surprise that the subjective perception of inequality is one of 
the key elements of the public attitudes towards reforms. In theory, income inequality may affect 
subjective welfare for several reasons, including pure inequality aversion and more sophisticated 
mechanisms involving the externalities of corruption and criminality (Alesina et al., 2004; Fong, 
2001; Alesina and Perroti, 1996). Yet inequality can also improve subjective welfare in certain 
contexts. This has been suggested by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973). The authors argue that 
societies experiencing rapid development may initially show tolerance for higher inequality, 
because they interpret it in terms of greater opportunities. This is also the idea of Alesina et al. 
(2004):  “… in the U.S., the poor see inequality as a ladder that, although steep, may be 
climbed...” This tolerance for inequality may, however, wither away over time: if expectations 
are not met, supporters of the development process may become its enemies. After such a 
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“turning point,” side-effects of development, and in particular, an increase in inequality, may 
swamp the subjective benefits of growth. 
The dynamic scenario sketched by Hirschman and Rothschild, including the downturn in public 
satisfaction and adhesion to reforms, might actually be taking place in the former socialist bloc. 
While the beginning of transition was perceived as a big reshuffling of cards with high 
uncertainty, after more than fifteen years, citizens of transition countries have acquired a more 
precise idea of the new economic regime and of their own prospects in the new society. 
Depending on how fair the process of social change and the resulting income distribution appears 
to their citizens, some transition countries may find themselves in the second part of the roadmap 
sketched by Hirschman and Rothschild.  
The objective of this paper is to test Hirschman and Rothschild’s conjecture, using a series of 
repeated cross-sections of exceptional frequency and length that cover the entire transition 
experience in Poland. We mainly focus on self-declared satisfaction with the state of the Polish 
economy (henceforth “country satisfaction”), which is both a satisfaction domain and a political 
attitude. We explore the relationship between income inequality and country satisfaction over 
time between 1992 and 2005, when Poland experienced sustained economic growth. We identify 
a break in the relationship between country satisfaction and income inequality at the end of 1996. 
In the first period (1992-1996), we observe a positive association between these variables, 
whereas in a second period (1997-2005), this relationship becomes negative. In order to interpret 
this break in the relationship, we also examine other satisfaction variables available in the survey. 
In the first period, inequality is associated with higher expectations, which is not true anymore in 
the second period, suggesting that it lost its informational value in the eyes of the population. In 
addition, people’s self-declared satisfaction with their personal situation is negatively and 
significantly associated with income inequality after 1996, whereas there was no statistically 
significant relationship in the earlier period. Additional evidence on the evolution of public 
opinion suggests that the changing tolerance for inequality coincided with the growing perception 
that high incomes are unmerited and often reflect corruption.   
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This paper is related to different strands of economic literature. First, the subjective perception of 
the country’s situation touches upon the political economy of development. Several papers have 
underlined the sociopolitical instability that results from income inequality (Alesina and Perotti, 
1996; Perroti, 1996). Income distribution concerns have also been shown to discourage 
individuals' adhesion to the deepening of market reforms or development policies, calling for 
fiscal policies that hamper economic growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 
1994). Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002) have argued that in Nineteenth Century Europe, the 
extension of voting rights that led to unprecedented redistributive programs can be viewed as a 
strategy by the elite to avoid political discontent and revolution, which was in turn fed by the 
inequalities rising from economic development and industrialization. Analyzing country 
satisfaction is a means to address these issues with the tools of the happiness literature, i.e., using 
subjective variables.  
This paper also contributes to the literatures on the relationship between income distribution and 
happiness and on the subjective foundations of the demand for redistribution (see, for instance, 
Senik, 2005, Clark et al., 2008). Most studies in this field find that individuals’ attitude towards 
income inequality depends on their beliefs and preferences regarding the factors of economic 
success and failure. Prospects of upward mobility make people more tolerant for inequality 
(Alesina et al., 2004; Alesina and la Ferrara, 2005), but fairness considerations also play an 
important role in explaining the degree of inequality aversion (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; 
Fong, 2001). In sum, people dislike inequality and suffer from it, when they view income 
differences as unmerited. 
The subjective welfare effect of inequality during the process of transition has been studied 
extensively. For instance, Sanfey and Teksoz (2007) find that income inequality has a positive 
effect on life satisfaction in transition countries, whereas the impact is negative in other countries 
from the World Values Survey. Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009) investigate a weaker 
relationship, ceteris paribus, between GDP and life satisfaction in transition countries, as 
compared to non-transition countries. They identify inequality as one of the culprits of the lower 
satisfaction in transition countries. Several papers treat the experience of transition as a "natural 
experiment" in order to assess the negative welfare effects of inequality (e.g., Ravallion and 
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Lokshin, 2001) and income comparisons (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Senik, 2004, 2008). Alesina 
and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2007) document the slow convergence of preferences for state 
intervention in East-Germany, after the shock of the German reunification. We follow this usage 
of transition as a country-wide experiment. Starting from a situation of relatively egalitarian 
distribution of income (notwithstanding other forms of inequality), transition to a market 
economy makes it possible to trace the relationship between unfolding inequality and subjective 
satisfaction, as we assume that most changes are perceived as exogenous shocks by citizens of 
the former socialist bloc.  
The following section presents the data, section 3 discusses the empirical strategy, and section 4 
presents the results. Last, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data  
The data are constructed from individual-level surveys carried out by CBOS in Poland.1 We 
exploit 84 surveys of representative samples of the Polish adult population, with samples of 
1000-1300 individuals per survey, covering the period 1992-2005 (six surveys per year). Even 
though some variables are available in earlier years, we choose 1992 as our starting date, the year 
that GDP growth resumed after two years of a significant decline. We focus on the period of 
sustained economic growth, during which the fall in satisfaction with country’s economic 
performance is most puzzling. In addition, our main variable of interest is missing in many dates 
before 1992.   
A standard set of questions was asked in each survey: gender, age, education, residential location, 
labor market status, and occupation. In terms of income, the best documented and most complete 
measure available is net total monthly household income per capita. This includes all of the 
revenues from the individual's main job, including bonuses, rewards, various additional 
remunerations, revenues from other jobs, including sporadic contracts, disability and old-age 
pensions, and other revenues and transfers. People were asked to indicate their net monthly 
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average income per capita over the last three months. We use this notion of income, deflated 
using the monthly consumer price index published by the Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS).  
The data also contain specific attitudinal questions. We mainly hinge on a satisfaction question 
(country satisfaction), which reflects the subjective attitude of the respondents concerning the 
general economic situation of the country. Given the context, this question also captures the 
feeling of the respondent towards the reform policy. 
Country satisfaction: How do you evaluate the economic situation in Poland? Respondents 
could tick one out of five possible answers: very good/good/neither good nor bad /bad/ very 
bad. 
In addition, we also use two other subjective questions that concern the personal situation of the 
respondents: 
Private satisfaction: How are your life and your family’s life? The proposed answers were: 
Very good/ good /neither good nor bad/bad /very bad. 
Private expectations: Do you think that in the coming year, you and your family will live: 
much better than now/a little bit better/the same as now/a little bit worse/much worse. 
All these variables were recoded so that higher numbers indicate greater satisfaction.We match 
the CBOS data to macroeconomic indicators taken from official sources (Central Statistical 
office, GUS): at the national level we use yearly GDP, the yearly GDP deflator, and the consumer 
price index; the monthly unemployment rate is measured at the regional level. We compute the 
Gini coefficient of income inequality using the successive surveys of the dataset. This measure of 
inequality is of “high quality” as defined by Deininger and Squire (1996): it is calculated on the 
basis of successive representative samples of the population and takes into account all sources of 
revenues.  
                                                                                                                                                              
1 The sample design is explained at http://www.cbos.pl/EN/About_us/design.shtml 
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The descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Tables A1 - A3 in the Appendix. Over 
the 1992-2005 period, the economy grew at an average rate of 4.4 percent. More precisely, 
average GDP growth rate reached 5.3 percent between 1992 and 1997, and then fell to 3.7 
percent after 1997. In the meantime, there was a rise in unemployment and inequality. The rate of 
unemployment rose from 13% in 1992 to 18% in 2005 (Table A3 in the Appendix). Income 
inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient was 0.32 at the beginning of 1992, but reached 
0.38 by the end of 2005 (Table A1 in the Appendix). 
Figure 1 displays yearly averages of the main variables of interest: country satisfaction, private 
expectations, private satisfaction, real GDP and the Gini coefficient. Although real GDP has been 
rising since 1992, satisfaction with the country’s economic situation improved only up to 1997, 
and then declined substantially until 2002, with a slight improvement after this date. The patterns 
of private satisfaction and expectations exhibit similar movements, albeit with a smaller 
amplitude. Eventually, the final level of all satisfaction variables remains higher in 2005 than it 
was in 1992. 
3. Empirical strategy 
We consider the relationship between country satisfaction and income inequality, as in Alesina, 
di Tella and MacCulloch (2004), who study the effect of income inequality in Europe and in the 
United States. We adopt the same specification in terms of statistical model and control variables. 
In contrast to Alesina et al. (2004), who perform a comparative static analysis of the relationship 
between income inequality and satisfaction in different environments, we are interested in the 
dynamic evolution of this relationship in one country.  
More precisely, we test for the presence of a structural break in this relationship, without 
imposing any specific date for the discontinuity, treating the breakpoint as endogenous. As Wald 
tests constructed with breaks treated as parameters do not possess standard large sample 
asymptotic distributions, we use the sup-Wald test based on the maximum of a sequence of Wald 
statistics, with critical values from Andrews (1993). The basic regression we estimate is: 
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Sit = aTGinit + b1Xit + b2 γT  + b3 θj + b4 inflationt + b5 unemploymentvt  + eit  (1) 
where Sit is the country satisfaction of individual i at date t, Ginit is an inequality measure 
calculated for each representative cross-section2; Xit represents the socio-economic characteristics 
of individual i at date t consisting of age, age-squared, gender, education, occupation, labor 
market status, household income per capita and residential location; γT are year dummies 
capturing the general macroeconomic and other circumstances that affect all individuals in a 
given year; θj are region dummies for seven regions (North, West, Centre-West, Centre, East, 
South-East and South-West); and eit is the error term. We also control for monthly inflation rate 
and monthly unemployment rate at the voivodeship level3, in order to separate the influence of 
income inequality from other macroeconomic determinants of country satisfaction. These 
variables are commonly used as macroeconomic determinants of satisfaction (see for example di 
Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald, 2003). 
As the satisfaction variables are ordinal, we estimate equation (1) using the ordered logit model. 
We pool individual observations from different surveys over time. We adjust standard errors to 
allow for clusters by cross-section (i.e., by t). Clustering is important because it takes into 
account intra-survey correlation of individual responses. 
We test the hypothesis that the coefficient on the Gini index (at) is the same over the entire 
period. Consequently, we use a partial structural change model, constraining the coefficients of 
the other explanatory variables to remain the same over all of the periods. Specifically:  
H0: aT = a* for all T  
H1: aT = a1 for T = 1992, …, TB  
      aT =  a2 for T = TB+1,…, 2005 
We consider different potential breaks, i.e. different values of TB from 1993 to 2004, trimming 
                                                 
2 Below we also consider cross-sectional variations in Gini coefficient.  
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the sample at about 15%. We choose to leave one year of observations at the beginning and at the end of 
each tested sample, which implies leaving about 15% of the sample either before or after the break 
(trimming at 15 %). We compute the Wald statistic for each value of TB in order to test whether the 
regression coefficient on the Gini estimated over the sub-period [1992, TB] is equal to that 
estimated over the sub-period [TB+1, 2005]. We calculate the Wald statistic over all possible 
breakpoints and compare the maximal value with the relevant critical value (taken from Andrews 
1993). If the sup Wald statistic exceeds the critical value, the test rejects the null hypothesis of 
equal coefficients. We then divide the sample into two parts at the estimated breakpoint and carry 
out a parameter constancy test for each sub-sample. If the hypothesis of no break in the sub-
samples is not rejected, we estimate equation (1) separately for each sub-sample.  
In order to understand which groups drive the average result, we exploit cross-sectional 
variations. We also run a series of robustness tests in order to exclude alternative explanations of 
the downturn in country satisfaction and to check that our results are robust to the use of 
alternative indices of income inequality. In order to enrich the picture of the changing perception 
of income inequality, we also explore the relationship between income inequality and other 
indicators of satisfaction available in the surveys. Finally, we use several public opinion polls that 
illustrate the changing attitudes of the population towards income differentiation.   
4. Results 
Structural break in the relationship between country satisfaction and income 
inequality 
First, we pool the data and estimate the country satisfaction controlling for all variables as in 
equation (1). The results are shown in Table A4 in the Appendix. The difference between 
columns 1 and 2 is that the latter includes two macroeconomic variables:  the regional rate of 
unemployment and the monthly rate of inflation. We observe that men, richer and more educated 
people, students, and higher occupations are more satisfied with the country's situation. Country 
satisfaction is U shaped in age. Pensioners, farmers, unqualified workers and those who live in 
rural areas are less satisfied than employees (the reference group). Comparison of the two 
                                                                                                                                                              
3  Voivodeship (wojewodztwo, in Polish) is an administrative unit. 
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columns shows that the coefficients on the individual characteristics are robust to the inclusion of 
macroeconomic indicators. Unemployment is negatively associated with country satisfaction 
whereas the coefficient of inflation is statistically insignificant. The coefficient of income 
inequality remains insignificant.  
We then try to identify a discontinuity in the relationship between income inequality and country 
satisfaction. As explained in section 3, we test the hypothesis of no break in the pooled sample. 
The results are displayed in Table 1. In column (1) the numbers are the values of chi2 
corresponding to Wald statistics for all possible breakpoints. In columns (2) and (3) we show the 
coefficients of the Gini index obtained for the periods before and after each potential break. Each 
row of the table corresponds to the year, which divides the sample into two parts. Country 
satisfaction is estimated then separately for each sub-sample. When the break point is situated in 
1996, the two coefficients on the Gini index, before and after the break, are significant at 1 % and 
have opposite signs. This does not happen for any other year-break. 
 The critical value from Andrews (1993) for one parameter and trimming at 15% is 8.85 at the 
5% level. Hence, as the sup-Wald equals 18.44, we identify the break at the end of 1996. 
However, because in 2000 the value of the Chi2 is also greater than the critical value, we check 
for the possible existence of a second break in the period 1997-2005. This time we apply 
trimming at 25% (the critical value is 7.93). The test is unable to accept the hypothesis of no 
break in the second sub-period. In order to make sure that the second break, although statistically 
insignificant, does not affect our results, we test the persistence of the break in 1996 keeping only 
the observations before 2000. The sup-Wald test in 1996 is now 16.71 (with trimming at 20% the 
critical value is 8.45).  
Consequently, we divide the whole sample into two sub-periods: 1992-1996 and 1997-2005. 
Table 2 shows the estimation results for equation (1) over the two sub-samples. In panel A we 
observe that when the sample is divided into two periods, the coefficient on income inequality is 
statistically significantly positive before 1997 (column 2) and then significantly negative after 
that date (column 3). If one admits the interpretation of the coefficient on the Gini index as the 
causal effect of income inequality on satisfaction, as do Alesina et al. (2004), then table 2 
suggests that the perception of inequality changes around the year 1997: after that date 
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individuals are less inclined to consider themselves satisfied with reforms and, more generally 
with the economic situation of their country, when inequality is high, even after controlling for 
individual income, a number of personal characteristics, inflation and unemployment, year and 
region. But before that date, inequality interpreted as a measure of higher opportunities, is 
positively correlated with subjective evaluation of reforms. More specifically, before the break, a 
one percentage point increase in the Gini index leads to a 0.9 percentage point decrease in the 
probability of considering the country economic situation as bad; after the break the same 
increase in the Gini index leads to a one percentage point increase in the probability of such 
answer. 
In panel B and C we verify that the results are robust to the use of alternative measures of 
inequality. One could argue that people have more local views of the income distribution and that 
the Gini coefficient calculated at the country level is a less precise measure of the level of 
inequality that the one people perceive in their closer environment. Thus, in panel B we report 
results based on a measure of income inequality calculated for different residential locations: 
large cities (over 100 000 inhabitants), smaller cities and rural areas. In panel C we measure 
income inequality based on our data as the standard deviation of log household income for each 
cross section. The results in panel B and C confirm the pattern observed in panel A: inequality 
measures are positively associated with the satisfaction variable in the first period, and turn out to 
be significantly negative in the second period.  
We must emphasize that we are not trying to test whether the setback in attitudes is due to an 
external exogenous shock. Rather, the implicit model that we have in mind is a cumulative 
process of disappointment, which at a certain point goes beyond a critical threshold (exhaustion 
of patience). Quoting Hirschman and Rothschild (1973, p. 552): “The turning point in attitudes is 
not caused by a sudden shock. It comes about “purely as a result of the passage of time – no 
particular outward event sets off this dramatic turnaround”. [In] “the easy early stage […] 
everybody seems to be enjoying the very process that will later be vehemently denounced and 
damned as one consisting essentially in “the rich becoming richer”. However, if we wanted to 
indicate some specific events that could have contributed to the turning point in the relationship 
between income inequality and country satisfaction, we could refer to the fact that 1997 coincides 
 13
with the announcement by the newly-appointed government of a wave of second-generation 
welfare-state reforms (concerning health, pensions and education), which was met with some 
reluctance by the population. It is likely that this has contributed to the “reform fatigue” of the 
population, by reinforcing the perception of the costs imposed by reforms. 
Who is most affected by inequality? 
Different segments of the population may differ in their perception of income inequality. In this 
section, we investigate attitudes of which particular groups drive the average result (established 
above). First, as income inequality is initially interpreted in terms of increased opportunities, the 
effects should be more pronounced for those individuals who had a longer experience of the 
socialist regime and who have experienced the transition process from the start. Thus, we expect 
older people to have higher expectations at the beginning of the transition and to be more 
disappointed afterwards. Table 3 reports the results separately for the sample of two cohorts, i.e. 
those who were born before 1970 and, therefore, were at least 23 years old in 1992 and those who 
were born in 1970 or after. It shows that it is older people who are initially more likely to see 
income differentiation in terms of opportunities. Indeed, the coefficient on the Gini index is 
statistically significantly positive (column 1) in the regression on the sub-sample of older people, 
whereas it is not significant in the regression on the sub-sample of younger people (column 3). In 
the second period, however, the coefficient on the Gini index is negative and statistically 
significant for both groups. The initial positive attitude of older people towards income inequality 
has vanished, leaving place to a general aversion for inequality. 
Second, we expect to see a difference in the perception of inequality depending on the ideological 
self-identification of individuals. Alesina et al. (2004) observed that left-wing Europeans were 
more affected by income inequality, as compared to right-wingers. The notions of left and right 
are not completely clear in the countries having experienced communism for 45 years, but we 
rely on the self-definition of individuals who answered the following question: “Please, describe 
your political opinions using the scale from 1 (left) to 7 (right).” We classified as left-wingers the 
respondents who replied ‘1’ and as right-wingers those who chose ‘7’ (left and right represents 
each about 5 percent before the break and 10 % after the break). Table 4 shows that in Poland, the 
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initial positive association between income inequality and satisfaction is statistically significant 
for right-wingers (who probably see income differentiation as a source of incentives and 
efficiency), but not for left-wingers (who are less likely to share this view. After 1996, a 
statistically significant negative association between income inequality and country satisfaction is 
observed in both groups. 
Overall, these results suggest that the initial perception of income differentiation was more 
positive in groups which had longer experience of socialism or defined themselves as right-
wingers. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that initially income differentiation in 
transition was taken as a sign of opportunity and efficiency, as these two groups of the population 
were more likely to welcome the reform at the onset of transition. 
Possible alternative explanations 
Due to the limitation of the data, we are unable to establish the direction of causality in the 
relationship between income inequality and country satisfaction. However, our objective is to 
assess the association between income inequality and satisfaction and to establish the existence of 
a break in this relationship over time. Hence, we need to rule out alternative potential 
explanations of the evolution in country satisfaction. The first natural suspect is time trend itself. 
As income inequality is rising along the whole considered period, the coefficient on the Gini 
index could be hiding the pure effect of time. This could happen if, the level of inequality 
notwithstanding, with the passage of time, people who initially had high expectations become 
disappointed. The inclusion of year dummies partly takes care of this issue. Alternatively, we 
have included a time trend in the estimation of equation (1). The results concerning the changing 
impact of income inequality were not altered (the coefficient on the Gini index was 5.569 (with 
standard deviation of 2.100) in the first period, and -13.725 (with standard deviation of 4.342) in 
the second period). 
Second, we considered the possibility that the results are driven by seasonal variations of country 
satisfaction. Table 5 shows that including monthly dummies in the basic regression does not 
affect the results.   
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Third, the changing tolerance for inequality could be due to the reduced importance of the 
welfare state. The public attitude towards inequality certainly depends on the extent of 
redistribution and social protection. Keane and Prasad (2002), following Garner and Terrel 
(1998), argued that in Poland at the beginning of transition substantial social transfers 
compensated for increasing wage inequality. The mechanisms of social transfers were thus 
critical in ensuring political support for reform. Their period of observation stops in 1997, but 
official statistics show that the share of social expenditure in GDP has remained stable at around 
23% since 1997. Hence, the changing tolerance for inequality does not seem to be associated with 
the withering away of the welfare state. 
Finally, we asked whether a similar break is observable in the relationship between country 
satisfaction and other macroeconomic variables. We, thus, carried the same test for the presence 
of a structural break in the relationships between (1) unemployment rate and country satisfaction 
and (2) inflation rate and country satisfaction. We find that the coefficients on unemployment 
remain negative in all sub-periods defined by consecutive breaks, whereas the coefficients on 
inflation remained statistically insignificant in almost all periods. Therefore, we conclude that our 
main result is not driven by a change in public opinion regarding other major macroeconomic 
indicators. 
To sum up, our results prove to be immune to several potential alternative explanations.  
Other indicators of satisfaction 
In order to complete the picture and provide more evidence on personal satisfaction during the 
transition process, we now turn to the relationship between two other subjective variables and 
income inequality over time. As shown in Figure 1, private satisfaction and private expectations 
follow a similar pattern as country satisfaction, but of smaller amplitude. Although more flat than 
for country satisfaction, these curves present the same downward inflexion at some point around 
the mid-1990’s. In addition, we observe a slight upturn around 2001 at the time when inequality 
receded. The level of private satisfaction and expectations is always higher than the level of 
country satisfaction. Interestingly, all curves share a common feature that the level of satisfaction 
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and expectations is higher in 2005 than it was initially in 1992. 
We first check whether the estimate of private satisfaction yields results that are consistent with 
those in the literature with respect to the usual individual level correlates of well-being (see for 
example Di Tella et al., 2003). As expected, we find a U-shaped relationship between age and 
satisfaction, and a positive correlation with income, education, and higher occupations. Men are 
happier than women, a frequent observation in Central and Eastern Europe and in Latin America 
(Graham and Pettinato, 2002; Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009; Easterlin, 2008). People who live 
in rural areas are more satisfied and optimistic about their future standard of living than are 
inhabitants of urban agglomerations, who, in turn, are more satisfied than those who live in large 
cities. By contrast, individuals who live in rural areas view the situation of the country in a more 
pessimistic way.  
Concerning the impact of inequality, following Hirschman’s scenario, we expect that rising 
inequality will end up deterring not only individuals’ appreciation of the country’s situation, but 
also their satisfaction with their own situation, as well as their expectations concerning their 
private situation.  
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 show individuals’ expectations regarding their living conditions. Our 
measure of inequality is associated with higher expectations up to 1997, but it remains 
uncorrelated with it thereafter. This suggests that inequality is initially interpreted as an opening 
of new opportunities, but in the later stages of transition loses this significance in the eyes of the 
population. Concerning private satisfaction, columns 1 and 2 show that it is initially weakly 
correlated with inequality. In the second period, however, the coefficient on the Gini index 
becomes statistically significant and negative. We conclude that the interpretation of income 
inequality has changed over the period under consideration, with a visible turning point in 1997. 
 This changing pattern of private satisfaction, in association with the rise in income inequality, 
may constitute an element of the famous Easterlin puzzle, i.e. the flatness of the average 
happiness score in developed countries, in spite of sustained GDP growth after the Second World 
War (Easterlin 2001). This empirical finding has stimulated an important subjective happiness 
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literature (see Clark et al., 2008), although it is still disputed (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008). Two 
main potential explanations have been proposed: adaptation effects and comparison effects. Other 
attempts to explain the Easterlin paradox consist in looking for omitted variables in the 
estimation of the relationship between income and subjective well-being (Di Tella and 
MacCulloch, 2008). The findings of this paper suggest that income distribution may constitute 
one of these missing variables that weaken the welfare effect of growth. 
Direct evidence from opinion polls 
In order to find some direct evidence that the attitude towards income inequality is changing over 
time, we finally use several public opinion polls ran by the Public Opinion Research Center 
survey (CBOS, 2003).  Figure 2 illustrates the weakening tolerance for income inequality, 
especially after 1997. Egalitarian attitudes gain in popularity, as attested by the rising percentage 
of people who consider that “the government should reduce differences between high and low 
wages” and that “inequalities of income are too large in Poland”. By contrast, the percentage of 
people who consider that “energetic entrepreneurs should be remunerated well in order to ensure 
the growth of the Polish economy”, that “future well-being in Poland requires remunerating well 
those who work hard”, or that “economic inequalities are necessary for economic progress”, have 
significantly decreased. The same pattern is visible in the data from the New Europe Barometer 
surveys.4 These data show that, in Poland, the proportion of individuals who declare that 
“incomes should be made equal so that there is no great difference in income” rather than 
“individual achievement should determine how much people are paid; the more successful should 
be paid more” rose from 24% in 1992 to 32% in 1998, and 54% in 2004. 
Figure 3, we use another survey (CBOS, 2004) to illustrate the share of population who consider 
corruption as an important problem. This sentiment increased sharply, from 32 percent in 1991 to 
75 percent in 2004. Overall, it appears that the perception of the Polish population concerning 
fairness and efficiency of the distribution of income, deteriorated during the period under 
observation, with a visible turning point around 1997. 
                                                 
4 New Europe Barometer Surveys, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Aberdeen. 
http://www.abdn.ac.uk/cspp/nebo.shtml 
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These results suggest that the parallel processes of income growth and inequality were initially 
well accepted by Poles, who might have seen them as a promise of future shared gains. However, 
by the late mid-1990s, high expectations seem to have given way to more negative attitudes, fed 
by the rising intolerance for income inequality, the continued growth in GDP notwithstanding. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence of a change in relationship between income inequality and 
individuals’ views of the economic situation of the country, which can partly be interpreted as a 
measure of support for reforms. The results suggest that income inequality was initially perceived 
as a positive signal of increased opportunities. However, after several years of rapid economic 
transformation, unfulfilled expectations and diminishing patience brought about a change in 
attitudes and growing inequality started to undermine satisfaction. Individuals seem to have 
become disappointed with transformation and skeptical about the legitimacy of the enrichment of 
reform winners. Various public opinion surveys confirm the changing popular opinions about the 
degree of corruption in the country and the desirability of high pay-offs in certain professions. 
Hence, the turning point in the tolerance for income inequality seems to come with the 
increasingly wide perception that the process that generates income distribution is itself unfair. 
The findings of this paper constitute a link between the literature on subjective well-being and the 
political economy literature focusing on inequality and growth. It provides evidence in support of 
a hypothesis put forth by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002) and Perotti (1996) that growth, 
which is accompanied by inequality, generates dissatisfaction and, as such, carries the menace of 
social instability.  
The results obtained in this paper offer a number of lessons for developing and transition 
countries: if it is important for governments to rapidly exploit the initial “window of opportunity” 
for reforms, it is also crucial that they adopt redistributive policies early on in the process, in 
order to ensure durable popular support for reforms. But the lesson can be extended to developed 
countries, as it stresses the importance to ensure that the functioning of the market and the 
process of income distribution are perceived as fair and transparent. 
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Fig. 1. Satisfaction variables, real GDP and the Gini coefficient, 1992-2005 (yearly averages) 
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
0,3
0,32
0,34
0,36
0,38
0,4
Left axis Country satisfaction Left axis Private satisfaction Left axis Private expectations
Left axis GDP real, 1992=1 Right axis Gini
 
 23
 
 
Figure 2. Opinions concerning income inequality, Poland 1994-2003 (%)  
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Source: CBOS (2003). Percentage of people who agree with the above statements 
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Figure 3. “In your opinion, how important is the corruption problem in Poland?” (%) 
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Source: CBOS (2004). Percentage of people who answer positively the following question: “In your 
opinion, how important is the corruption problem in Poland: very important/rather important/not very 
important/not important”.  
 
 25
Table1.  Test of a break in the relationship between income inequality and country satisfaction  
 
  
Wald test 
 
Gini index 
before the break 
 
Gini index 
after the break 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
1992     
1993 7.09 5.685*** 
[1.668] 
-1.394 
[2.056] 
1994 3.98 4.418** 
[2.034] 
-1.586 
[2.223] 
1995 6.31 4.358*** 
[1.644] 
-3.299 
[2.592] 
1996 18.44 5.828*** 
[1.732] 
-6.116*** 
[2.177] 
1997 8.10 3.583* 
[1.891] 
-6.040** 
[2.821] 
1998 7.00 3.202* 
[1.833] 
-6.155** 
[3.035] 
1999 5.54 2.804 
[1.802] 
-5.828* 
[3.203] 
2000 14.12 3.312* 
[1.700] 
-8.910*** 
[2.810] 
2001 3.42 1.231 
[1.928] 
-7.861* 
[4.526] 
2002 0.83 0.631 
[1.869] 
-6.053 
[7.075] 
2003 1.96 0.791 
[1.845] 
-10.747 
[8.033] 
2004 0.53 0.074 
[1.855] 
4.600 
[5.943] 
2005     
 
The numbers in column (1) are values of chi2 corresponding to Wald statistics for all possible breakpoints. 
We test the existence of a break, trimming at 15%. The critical value from Andrews (1993) for one 
parameter and trimming at 15% is 8.85 at the 5% level. In columns (2) and (3) we show the coefficients 
of the Gini index obtained for the periods before and after each break. 
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Table 2. Country satisfaction and income inequality before and after the break. Ordered logit  
 
  
1992-1996 
 
1997-2005 
 
Panel A   
Gini 5.906*** -6.443*** 
 [1.815] [2.183] 
Log household income 0.330*** 0.330*** 
 [0.024] [0.021] 
Inflation 0.022 0.082** 
 [0.023] [0.037] 
Unemployment -0.008*** -0.017*** 
 [0.003] [0.004] 
Observations 30520 43061 
Chi2 52297 9210 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 
 
Panel B 
  
Gini by residential location 2.052*** 
(0.571] 
-2.382*** 
[0.881] 
Chi2 48193 6756 
Pseudo R² 0.055 0.057 
 
Panel C 
  
Standard deviation of 
household income 
0.001*** 
[0.000] 
-0.001*** 
[0.000] 
Chi2 12338 8309 
Pseudo R² 0.056 0.057 
   
 
The dependent variable, country satisfaction, scores the answers to the following questions:  How do you 
assess current economic situation in Poland? Answers from 1 “very bad” to 5 “very good” (Country 
satisfaction). Controls in panel A include gender, age, age-squared, education, residential location (except in 
panel B), labor market status, occupation, region dummies, and year dummies. In Panels B and C log 
household income, inflation and unemployment are also included. Gini coefficients and standard deviation 
of household income are calculated for each successive representative cross-section. All standard errors (in 
brackets) are clustered by cross-section. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels 
respectively.   
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Table 3. Country satisfaction and income inequality: cohort effects. Ordered logit. 
  
Born before 1970 
 
Born after 1969 
 
 1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gini 6.351*** -6.386*** 1.237 -6.791*** 
 [1.802] [2.265] [2.834] [2.410] 
Log household income 0.335*** 0.365*** 0.295*** 0.232*** 
 [0.028] [0.022] [0.065] [0.035] 
Regional unemployment -0.009*** -0.018*** -0.005 -0.011* 
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.009] [0.006] 
Inflation rate 0.021 0.088** 0.034 0.049 
 [0.023] [0.040] [0.032] [0.039] 
Observations 27851 34818 2669 8243 
chi2 644537 11502 5378140 1761 
Pseudo R2 0,05 0,06 0,06 0,05 
log likelihood -31910 -40627 -2955 -9488 
Controls include gender, age, age-squared, education, residential location, labour market status, 
occupation, region dummies, and year dummies. All standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by cross-
section. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.   
Table 4. Country satisfaction and income inequality: left and right. Ordered logit. 
  
Left 
 
Right 
 
 1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gini 0.871 -6.063** 12.341** -8.523** 
 [4.117] [2.944] [4.820] [4.336] 
Log household income 0.598*** 0.210*** 0.241** 0.374*** 
 [0.114] [0.072] [0.111] [0.073] 
Inflation  0.106*** 0.039 0.028 0.113** 
 [0.041] [0.062] [0.043] [0.054] 
Unemployment -0.011 -0.006 0.002 -0.006 
 [0.015] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] 
Observations 1081 3035 1564 3168 
chi2 18803 1106 17005 1681 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.08 
log likelihood -1293.81 -3580 -1946 -3797 
Controls include gender, age, age-squared, education, residential location, labour market status, 
occupation, region dummies, and year dummies. All standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by cross-
section. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.   
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Table 5. Country satisfaction: controlling for seasonality. Ordered logit. 
 
  
1992-1996 
 
1997-2005 
 
Gini 6.289*** -6.061*** 
 [2.061] [1.669] 
Inflation 0.085*** -0.046 
 [0.031] [0.047] 
Unemployment -0.010*** -0.017*** 
 [0.003] [0.004] 
_Imonth_2  0.015 
  [0.117] 
_Imonth_3 -0.026 -0.322*** 
 [0.103] [0.112] 
_Imonth_5 0.096 -0.266** 
 [0.116] [0.105] 
_Imonth_6 0.187**  
 [0.081]  
_Imonth_7 0.319*** -0.363*** 
 [0.117] [0.128] 
_Imonth_9 0.086 -0.214* 
 [0.089] [0.115] 
_Imonth_10 0.427***  
 [0.106]  
_Imonth_11 0.266** -0.217** 
 [0.109] [0.110] 
_Imonth_12 0.522***  
 [0.121]  
Observations 30520 43061 
chi2 20463.40 11758.02 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 
log likelihood -34853 -50140 
Controls include gender, age, age-squared, education, residential location, labour market status, 
occupation, region dummies, and year dummies. All standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by cross-
section. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.   
  
 29
Table 6. A reversal in private expectations and satisfaction 
  
Private satisfaction 
 
 
Private expectations 
 1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gini 0.750 -2.814** 8.408*** 0.009 
 [1.042] [1.378] [2.326] [1.352] 
Inflation 0.014 0.010 0.017 0.015 
 [0.010] [0.028] [0.034] [0.043] 
Unemployment 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] 
log household income 1.274*** 1.291*** 0.309*** 0.361*** 
 [0.034] [0.019] [0.033] [0.021] 
Observations 32357 45335 67550 27115 
chi2 47168 26666 2707 3855 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.02 
log likelihood -34829 -47974 -77419 -32698 
 
The dependent variables are the answers to the following questions:  Do you think that in a year your life 
and the life of your family will be: Answers from 1 “much worse” to 5 “much better than now” (Private 
expectations); How do you and your family live? Answers from 1 “very bad” to 5 “very good” (Private 
satisfaction). Controls include gender, age, age-squared, education, residential location, labor market 
status, occupation, regional dummies, time trend, and year dummies. Gini coefficients are calculated for 
each successive representative cross-section. All standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by cross-
section. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.   
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Subjective variables, household income and the Gini coefficient: mean values of 
variables for each cross-section.  
 
Dates 
(year_month) 
Country 
satisfaction 
Private 
Expectations 
Private  
satisfaction 
Household 
income 
Gini 
coefficient 
1992_01 2.002 2.679 2.753   
1992_05 1.944 2.531 2.613 5.454 0.323 
1992_07 2.036 2.849 2.640 5.528 0.331 
1992_09 2.060 2.742 2.635 5.569 0.312 
1992_10 2.147 2.707 2.652 5.515 0.339 
1992_12 2.108 2.453 2.610 5.467 0.320 
1993_01 2.124 2.637 2.659 5.516 0.353 
1993_03 2.126 2.641 2.677 5.528 0.355 
1993_05 2.085 2.741 2.713 5.527 0.324 
1993_07 2.124 2.700 2.628 5.490 0.325 
1993_09 2.272 3.046 2.663 5.486 0.379 
1993_11 2.347 3.169 2.720 5.532 0.347 
1994_01 2.343 2.924 2.788 5.488 0.351 
1994_03 2.235 2.704 2.703 5.407 0.345 
1994_06 2.437 2.886 2.738 5.471 0.357 
1994_07 2.462 2.861 2.769 5.514 0.347 
1994_09 2.379 2.733 2.818 5.510 0.337 
1994_11 2.426 2.859 2.749 5.542 0.323 
1995_01 2.521 2.928 2.832 5.546 0.339 
1995_03 2.430 2.952 2.809 5.519 0.336 
1995_05 2.526 2.904 2.851 5.573 0.306 
1995_07 2.599 2.963 2.847 5.569 0.353 
1995_09 2.574 2.931 2.841 5.566 0.339 
1995_11 2.606 3.117 2.868 5.683 0.358 
1996_01 2.943 3.137 2.975 5.650 0.364 
1996_03 2.786 3.041 2.911 5.574 0.348 
1996_05 2.702 2.988 2.938 5.614 0.329 
1996_07 2.699 2.953 2.923 5.668 0.336 
1996_09 2.724 2.941 2.959 5.675 0.329 
1996_11 2.771 3.006 2.925 5.691 0.342 
1997_01 2.745 3.072 2.906 5.726 0.371 
1997_03 2.687 3.028 2.987 5.728 0.344 
1997_05 2.840 3.048 3.023 5.807 0.332 
1997_07 2.895 3.029 3.074 5.749 0.324 
1997_09 2.939 3.141 3.005 5.794 0.352 
1997_11 2.866 3.052 2.985 5.801 0.328 
1998_01 2.771 2.929 3.000 5.720 0.337 
1998_03 2.769 2.965 2.942 5.706 0.354 
1998_05 2.774 2.988 2.967 5.797 0.337 
1998_07 2.721 2.957 2.991 5.822 0.339 
1998_09 2.746 2.878 2.943 5.834 0.352 
1998_11 2.699 2.923 2.997 5.823 0.353 
1999_01 2.706 2.889 2.945 5.805 0.347 
1999_03 2.457 2.830 2.879 5.735 0.363 
1999_05 2.471 2.828 2.912 5.818 0.342 
1999_07 2.396 2.749 2.875 5.823 0.345 
 31
Table A1 continued. 
Dates 
(year_month) 
Country 
satisfaction 
Private 
Expectations 
Private  
satisfaction 
Household 
income 
Gini 
coefficient 
1999_09 2.330 2.814 2.882 5.879 0.353 
1999_11 2.431 2.840 2.941 5.856 0.350 
2000_01 2.490 2.848 2.874 5.800 0.372 
2000_02 2.427 2.781 2.889 5.755 0.365 
2000_05 2.320 2.792 2.904 5.827 0.365 
2000_07 2.339 2.751 2.826 5.775 0.337 
2000_09 2.375 2.854 2.882 5.814 0.359 
2000_11 2.348 2.834 2.830 5.779 0.354 
2001_01 2.383 2.844 2.896 5.787 0.328 
2001_03 2.201 2.770 2.809 5.791 0.368 
2001_05 2.198 2.781 2.842 5.783 0.351 
2001_07 2.098 2.841 2.864 5.840 0.377 
2001_09 2.147 2.879 2.846 5.811 0.340 
2001_11 2.077 2.899 2.870 5.811 0.378 
2002_01 2.071 2.834 2.881 5.831 0.361 
2002_03 2.056 2.791 2.849 5.779 0.375 
2002_05 2.071 2.788 2.835 5.824 0.379 
2002_07 2.035 2.839 2.864 5.885 0.389 
2002_09 2.160 2.876 2.910 5.820 0.366 
2002_11 2.247 2.885 2.906 5.852 0.357 
2003_01 2.249 2.867 2.914 5.832 0.373 
2003_03 2.111 2.836 2.880 5.822 0.355 
2003_05 2.060 2.873 2.900 5.864 0.363 
2003_07 2.134 2.804 2.882 5.806 0.356 
2003_09 2.188 2.887 2.997 5.819 0.360 
2003_11 2.120 2.683 2.917 5.778 0.369 
2004_01 2.257 2.864 2.920 5.822 0.372 
2004_03 2.121 2.772 2.934 5.802 0.381 
2004_05 2.370 2.924 2.982 5.882 0.367 
2004_07 2.323 2.891 2.942 5.786 0.351 
2004_09 2.451 2.939 3.007 5.811 0.369 
2004_11 2.445 2.902 2.961 5.773 0.355 
2005_01 2.541 2.981 2.980 5.737 0.363 
2005_03 2.415 2.966 2.926 5.747 0.351 
2005_05 2.525 3.073 2.965 5.809 0.362 
2005_07 2.371 2.903 2.989 5.782 0.369 
2005_09 2.471 2.974 2.971 5.776 0.365 
2005_11 2.588 3.123 3.037 5.778 0.377 
      
 
Country satisfaction:  How do you assess current economic situation in Poland? Answers from 1 “very 
bad” to 5 “very good”; Private expectations: Do you think that in a year your life and the life of your 
family will be: Answers from 1”much worse” to 5”much better” than now; Private satisfaction: How do 
you and your family live? Answers from 1 “very bad” to 5 “very good”.  Household income is the 
logarithm of net total monthly household income per capita, deflated by the monthly CPI. Gini 
coefficients are calculated for each successive representative cross-section.  
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Table A2. The socio-demographic structure of the sample, yearly averages. 
Panel A 
 
Year 
 
Female 
 
Age 
 
Secondary 
education 
 
Rural areas 
 
Urban areas 
 
Large cities 
       
1992 0.55 46.77 0.34 0.42 0.52 0.28 
1993 0.55 47.93 0.35 0.42 0.52 0.28 
1994 0.48 47.89 0.37 0.40 0.53 0.28 
1995 0.55 48.24 0.37 0.40 0.51 0.29 
1996 0.55 47.61 0.39 0.37 0.55 0.28 
1997 0.57 47.53 0.41 0.37 0.52 0.31 
1998 0.56 47.74 0.41 0.37 0.53 0.30 
1999 0.56 48.17 0.43 0.37 0.52 0.30 
2000 0.55 48.13 0.45 0.37 0.50 0.32 
2001 0.56 47.86 0.44 0.36 0.49 0.32 
2002 0.55 48.46 0.46 0.35 0.46 0.35 
2003 0.55 47.82 0.46 0.37 0.47 0.33 
2004 0.52 46.89 0.46 0.41 0.51 0.29 
2005 0.53 46.73 0.44 0.37 0.51 0.30 
 
Urban areas are defined as having no more than 100 000 inhabitants. Large cities are defined as having 
over 100 000 inhabitants. 
Panel B 
 
Year 
 
Unemployed 
 
Pensioners 
 
Farm 
 
Not working 
 
Unqualified 
workers 
 
Qualified 
workers 
 
Higher 
occupations 
 
Self-employed 
         
1992 0.08 0.34 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.03 
1993 0.05 0.44 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.04 
1994 0.04 0.45 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.04 
1995 0.06 0.43 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.04 
1996 0.08 0.37 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.04 
1997 0.08 0.35 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.04 
1998 0.07 0.37 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.04 
1999 0.08 0.37 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.04 
2000 0.09 0.37 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.04 
2001 0.12 0.37 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.04 
2002 0.13 0.37 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.04 
2003 0.12 0.35 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.04 
2004 0.12 0.34 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.04 
2005 0.11 0.33 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.03 
         
 
Higher occupations include directors, presidents and managerial staff in public administration, liberal 
professions with higher education, engineers, school directors, physicians, and lawyers.  
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Table A3. Macroeconomic variables: yearly averages 
  
  
Year 
 
Nominal GDP 
 
Real GDP 
growth 
 
Unemployment 
rate 
 
Gini coefficient 
(our data) 
 
Gini coefficient 
UNICEF data 
      
1992 114243 102.6 13.1 0.325 0.274 
1993 155780 103.8 14.9 0.348 0.317 
1994 210377 105.2 16.5 0.343 0.323 
1995 306318 107.0 15.2 0.339 0.321 
1996 385448 106.2 14.4 0.342 0.328 
1997 469372 107.1 11.6 0.342 0.334 
1998 549467 105.0 10.0 0.345 0.326 
1999 665688 104.5 11.9 0.350 0.334 
2000 744378 104.3 13.9 0.359 0.345 
2001 779564 101.2 16.1 0.356 0.341 
2002 808578 101.4 17.7 0.371 0.353 
2003 843156 103.9 18.0 0.363 0.356 
2004 924538 105.3 19.6 0.366 - 
2005 982565 103.6 18.2 0.353 
 
- 
 
Source: Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS). Gini coefficients calculated using yearly average 
household income in our data. The estimates of the Gini coefficient from the UNICEF Database (IRC 
TransMONEE 2005) are based on interpolated distributions from grouped data from household budget 
surveys reported to the MONEE project.  
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Table A4. Country satisfaction, ordered logit.  
 
 (1) (2) 
Gender -0.061*** -0.062*** 
 [0.021] [0.021] 
Age -0.031*** -0.032*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] 
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Log household income 0.334*** 0.329*** 
 [0.016] [0.016] 
Education  0.117*** 0.115*** 
 [0.024] [0.024] 
Unemployed -0.032 -0.030 
 [0.028] [0.027] 
Pensioners -0.110*** -0.107*** 
 [0.023] [0.023] 
Farm -0.173*** -0.170*** 
 [0.034] [0.034] 
Unqworkers -0.086** -0.086*** 
 [0.034] [0.033] 
Qualified workers -0.019 -0.021 
 [0.031] [0.031] 
Not working 0.133*** 0.129*** 
 [0.039] [0.038] 
Higher occupations 0.189*** 0.189*** 
 [0.038] [0.038] 
Self-employed 0.040 0.039 
 [0.047] [0.047] 
Students 0.211*** 0.209*** 
 [0.041] [0.041] 
Rural areas -0.152*** -0.154*** 
 [0.022] [0.023] 
Large cities -0.022 -0.037 
 [0.025] [0.025] 
West -0.076** -0.087*** 
 [0.031] [0.031] 
Centre West -0.017 -0.064** 
 [0.030] [0.031] 
Centre -0.132*** -0.202*** 
 [0.029] [0.030] 
East -0.204*** -0.247*** 
 [0.039] [0.039] 
South-East -0.083*** -0.150*** 
 [0.030] [0.032] 
South-West 0.149*** 0.058* 
 [0.031] [0.034] 
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Table A4, continued 
 
   
cut1:Constant -0.405 2.616 
 [0.614] [2.450] 
cut2:Constant 2.066*** 5.088** 
 [0.612] [2.449] 
cut3:Constant 4.077*** 7.101*** 
 [0.614] [2.449] 
cut4:Constant 8.618*** 11.643*** 
 [0.625] [2.467] 
Gini 0.074 0.087 
 [1.865] [1.834] 
Unemployment  -0.012*** 
  [0.002] 
Inflation  0.032 
  [0.023] 
Observations 73581 73581 
chi2 4633.67 4531.66 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 
log likelihood -85275.60 -85242.27 
 
Country satisfaction answers the following question: How do you assess current economic situation in 
Poland? Answers from 1 “very bad” to 5 “very good”; Gini coefficients are calculated for each successive 
representative cross-section. Yearly dummies included. Omitted variables: men, less than secondary 
education, urban areas (with less than 100 000 inhabitants), employees, and north region. All standard 
errors (in brackets) are clustered by cross-section.* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
